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 The aim of this chapter is to compare state-imposed 
constructions of the status and role of refugee women in Serbia 
(Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) with these women's lived 
experiences, and to explore the complexity of the problems they 
face in the new nation-state.1   
 An assumption inherent in the politics and policies of 
exclusionary ethnic-national identifications, exemplified by 
the recent conflicts in the post-Yugoslav states, is that an 
ethnic-national collectivity represents an organic wholeness. 
These collectivities are perceived as 'natural', and membership 
in them is dichotomized: one belongs, or one does not. This 
assumption leads to 'political nihilism' (Kaldor, 1993: 108) 
when claims to power are based on a concept of citizenship in 
which ethnicity is defined as the primary source of identity 
and belonging. In such a context no political debate or 
movement is allowed and there is no possibility for political 
ideas or political parties to gain real social substance 
(ibid.: 108-109). As one Serbian 'patriot'2 stated, 'Let Serbs 
be Serbs, not citizens' (Vreme, 27 April 1996). This 'political 
                     
    1 The complex realities of the women's lives as refugees 
depisted here are based on data collected during my research in 
Serbia. The sources for the research on Women Refugees in 
Serbia: Ethnic-National Identity and Perceptions of the 
Conflict in the Former Yugoslavia, include: observations made 
during fieldwork, in-depth interview data with 18 refugee women 
from various ethnic-nationalities, newspaper articles, papers, 
newsletters and journals. The field work was conducted in the 
Summer 1994, 1995. 1996. The first phase of this research was 
funded by the Centre for Refugee Studies, York University, 
Canada. The support is gratefully acknowledged. 
    2 The speaker is one of the Serbian volunteers to the 'White 
Eagles', Serbian paramilitary responsible for the most brutal 
atrocities in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in Croatia. 
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nihilism', thus, embodies a political voluntarism and is easily 
transformed into an unrestrained power of state bureaucrats in 
dealing with refugees. 
 The chapter explores the patterns of state intervention 
effecting the roles and status of refugee women in Serbia, and 
the ways in which these interventions have resulted in and 
reflect an essentialized, male-defined, concept of the nation. 
The discussion examines state-imposed divisions among refugee 
women along and within ethnic-national lines and their broader 
social and political implications. 
 
The Political Context: Implications for Refugees' Safety 
 
 Before examining the specific problems of women refugees 
in Serbia, there is a need to evaluate 'the relationship of the 
host country to the refugee producing country', since, as 
Moussa (1993: 177) points out, the reception refugees encounter 
in the countries where they seek refugee status largely depends 
on this relationship. 
  The central element which crucially shaped the situation 
of refugees in the recent conflict in post-Yugoslav states was 
a political context in which almost all of the regional host 
governments were involved in wars - the exceptions being the 
governments of Slovenia and Macedonia. By August '95, the 
effect of these conflicts and the politics of ethnic-
nationalism was to uproot every fourth or fifth citizen of the 
region. A large majority of these four to five million 
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'ethnically cleansed' persons3 are refugees in the neighbouring 
post-Yugoslav states (ISHR, 1994). They fled predominantly to 
Croatia and Serbia, and to a lesser extent to other post-
Yugoslav states. In such a political context, two basic refugee 
rights - the right to enter a country of asylum and the right 
to remain - have been breached by host governments acting 
according to their political objectives. The USCR reports 
(1993a: 8-9, 21; 1995: 131, 173) indicate that the refugee 
policies of the governments of Croatia and Serbia were coloured 
by events in the war zones.   
 These political conditions imposed a number of 
restrictions on refugee safety and wellbeing. The problems have 
legal, social, political, as well as psychological implications 
for refugees and for their adaptation to new life situations. 
In such a political context, the position of refugee women is 
particularly difficult as a result of gender specific issues. 
Their situation is generally framed, in Indra's words (1993: 
763), by an asymmetry of power and voice between the state on 
one hand, and refugees on the other. However, as Indra (ibid.: 
763) further argues, this asymmetry is gender-specific since 
those who are both refugees and women may be subjected 
simultaneously to two overlapping silencing processes. How this 
gender-specific asymmetry originates in relation between 
                     
    3 The total population of Yugoslavia before the war was 22 
million. The four to five million 'ethnically cleansed' persons 
include refugees, internally displaced persons, as well as 
approximately 700,000 people who left the country in the last 
couple of years seeking political asylum in European countries. 
The data include UNHCR report, July 1995, as well as the 
instances of 'ethnic cleansing' in Srebrenica and Zepa (Bosnia-
Herzegovina) and in the Krajina region of Croatia in July and 
August 1995 (Nasa Borba, 10 August 1995). 
  
 
 5
individuals and the state may be explained in terms of 
Pateman's (1988) analysis of the Western social and political 
order more generally. Pateman argued, it will be recalled, that 
the state's construction of relationships in the private domain 
(i.e., marriage and the family) has determined women's status 
as citizens in the public domain. Thus, the rise of the notion 
of state citizenship was constructed in terms of the 'Rights of 
Man'.  
 The ways in which this gender-specific asymmetry of power 
between the state and refugees operate in a particular context 
will be elaborated below. 
 
Ethnically Homogeneous States and Refugees: The Question of 
Gender Implications  
 
 The point of departure for discussing the particular 
relations of refugee women with the Serbian state is to be 
found in ethnic nationalists' claim to ethnically homogeneous 
territories and states. One of the main characteristics of this 
form of nation-state building in the region has been the 
construction of boundaries according to various exclusionary 
and inclusionary criteria on the basis of ethnic-national 
divisions. This has clear gender implications, as we shell see. 
Both women and men participate in ethnic-national struggles and 
are victimized by ethnic-national ideologies and politics. 
Nonetheless, there is a difference between their experiences as 
participants or victims.  
 Whenever the creation of boundaries between ethnic-
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national collectivities involves violent conflict, it is 
inevitably accompanied by militarization. As Enloe (1993) 
emphasizes, militarizing transformations are embedded in 
'changing ideas about manliness - manliness as it supports a 
state, and manliness as it informs a nation'(ibid.: 247). These 
changes in ideas about masculinity imply complementary 
transformations in ideas about femininity. This 
interdependency, as Enloe argues, is a social construct that 
usually privileges masculinity (ibid.: 248). 
 The critical element of an aggressive ethnic-nationalist 
ideology is, as stated elsewhere (Korac 1993), the violence 
embodied in militant masculinity. Violence-oriented masculinity 
becomes the main means of recruiting individuals who are 
capable of committing insane atrocities because their masculine 
militant collectivity is the ultimate determinant of good and 
evil (ibid). A counter-balance to such violence-oriented 
masculinity is an emotional, committed, supportive but passive 
femininity. These differentiated roles of women and men within 
militarized ethnic-national collectivities result in various 
forms of violence with gender-specific meanings.  
 Violence-oriented masculinity, as discussed eslewhere 
(Korac, forthcoming), does not victimize solely women. It 
implies forms of victimization of men too, from killing and 
torture body mutilation. Women are commonly victimized through 
rape, expulsion and forced migration. This gendered difference 
in experiences of violence stems from the symbolic significance 
women bear in the relations between ethnic-national 
collectivities, as analyzed by Enloe (1989). She points to a 
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tendency to  cunstract women as precious property of the 
'enemy'. As such, they represent symbolic markers of the 
community and culture to be 'cleansed', and their bodies become 
territories to be seized and conquered.4 By contrast, men have 
a more active role in war and, as a rule, most often enter 
'history' as victors. 
 The massive gendered population transfer in the region of 
post-Yugoslav states, where over 70 percent of refugees in some 
regions are women and children (USCR 1993), has operated, I 
propose, as a crucial symbolic and material element in 
(re)constructing boundaries between ethnic-national 
collectivities. Of course, instances of women becoming 'special 
targets' in conflict and war zones are not new. However, in the 
context of post-Yugoslav state-building, it has a specific 
meaning.  
 In this conflict, uprooted women become symbolically and 
strategically important in the destruction of opposed ethnic-
national collectivities. The role women play in this process is 
intrinsically related to their role in the ideological 
production and biological reproduction of their ethnic-national 
collectivities. As several studies have already pointed out 
(Yuval-Davis and Anthias 1989; Walby 1992; Brah 1993; Yuval-
Davis 1993), women are conceived as cultural embodiments of 
collectivities and their boundaries as well as participants in 
                     
    4 Discussion of the meaning of rape in these wars, and the 
nation-states' response to this form of violence against women, 
is beyond the scope of this paper. However, the importance of 
this issue for a more complex analysis of the relation of women 
and nation-states is acknowledged. This issue is addressed in 
'Ethnic Conflict, Rape, and Feminism: the Case of Yugoslavia' 
(Korac, 1996a). 
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ethnic-national struggles. Moreover, Copelon (1994: 207) argues 
that women who are seen traditionally as caretakers, guardians 
of their children, men and homes, and hence as pillars of a 
society in a time called peace, represent these roles even more 
starkly in a time of war. Hence, a forced migration of women in 
wars expressing ethnic-national oppositions is both practically 
and symbolically the most effective way to (re)shape the 
boundaries of an ethnic-national collectivity. Forcing women to 
flee their homes is, however, just one of the critical elements 
in this process. The process of (re)shaping boundaries 
continues in the place of women's exile. 
 
Divisions among refugee women along ethnic-national lines 
              
 
 According to the official estimates of the High Commission 
for Refugees and the Red Cross of Serbia (April, 1994), the 
total number of refugees in Serbia is estimated at 400,000. 77 
per cent are Serbs, nine per cent Muslims, two point six per 
nect Croats, and eleven point four per cent 'others' (i.e., 
Albanians, Bulgarians, Hungarians, Jews, Romanians, Yugoslavs, 
etc.). Women compose 85.2 per cent of the refugee population 
(aged 18 years and over). (Refugees in Serbia, 1994: 6-7). 
  Exile in Serbia produced a range of individual, social and 
political problems for women refugees of minority ethnic-
nationalities. Although the government grants a temporary 
refugee status to refugees who are not of Serbian ethnic-
national background, this officially and legally equal 
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treatment of all refugees, regardless of their ethnic-
nationality, is undermined by the everyday problems faced by 
refugees from minority ethnic-nationalities.  
 Given the context of the conflict in the region, Serbia/FR 
Yugoslavia as a country actively involved in a war in which 
people from 'other' ethnic-nationalities were marked as 
enemies. Even though these refugees have escaped the immediate 
danger of the war zone, the host country can hardly be 
perceived as a 'safe place'. The majority of these non-Serbian 
refugees are accommodated in 'collective centres'.5  Nermina,6 a 
Bosnian Muslim refugee women, explains the situation in these 
centres: 
I'm in an environment where the women are traumatized. 
They have lost their husbands, children; their 
husbands are at the front. They take sides, they are 
nationally oriented, committed. When they listen to 
the news they comment, they support these 
stands[...]One of the women said to me: "But you're 
in Serbia, you must support this here". In other 
words, I have to support this policy, such as it is.  
The experience of second Bosnian Muslim refugee woman reveals 
an individual strategy that refugee women from non-Serbian 
ethnic-nationalities commonly use in their struggle to survive 
in a hostile environment: 
                     
    5 'Collective centres' or refugee camps in Serbia 
accommodate 6 percent of the refugee population. The remaining 
94 percent of the refugees are accommodated by families (i.e., 
relatives, friends, etc.). (Refugees in Serbia, 1994: 6-7). 
    6 a pseudonym 
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I only had some minor problems with a woman here (she 
moved out recently) over the national issue. She kept 
on raising it, although I never raise it in my 
conversation. She provoked me a little, she even told 
some people here I hated Serbs, Milosevic [president 
of Serbia] and other things. Which is completely 
untrue: I don't hate Serbs and Serbia. I don't hate 
them, but I don't like Milosevic[...]I don't agree 
with his politics. 
Women refugees from minority nationalities tend not initiate 
discussions of sensitive political issues. Given the context of 
their flight, their very presence represents a 'grave breach' 
of the aggressive Serbian nationalist cause for war. They have 
to silence and suppress their political views and beliefs, 
unless absolutely necessary: they tend to make themselves 
'invisible'. This 'strategy of silence' is a common strategy of 
women's resistance to 'gendered workings of power' (Enloe, 
1993: 246) in 'a time called peace.' However, as social and 
political power shifts radically, this strategy becomes a 
central form of resistance both between and within genders. 
Consequently, fear endures and a real problem remains in 
dealing with a collectivity to which these women represent a 
demonized ethnic-national group. In this respect, the place of 
exile carries the characteristics of a war zone. 
 
Divisions Among Refugee Women Within a Single Ethnic-
Nationality 
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 The politics of ethnic nationalism produces yet another 
set of problems, this time for women refugees of the majority 
ethnic-nationality. Although ethnic nationalists should, in 
theory, treat all refugees of the same ethnic nationality 
'naturally', the pragmatic interests of the state cause 
internal differences and struggles over boundary definitions of 
ethno-national collectivity. Hence, even the rights of the 
refugees who are of the same ethno-national background as the 
majority population in their host country are seriously 
threatened.  
 For example, Serbs born on the territory of one of the new 
'Serbian states' in Croatia or Bosnia-Herzegovina do not have 
the right to citizenship in the FR Yugoslavia.  Moreover, since 
the government wanted to ensure a sufficient Serbian population 
on these 'liberated' territories once the war had ended, the 
government imposed restrictions on maintaining refugee status 
in Serbia (FR Yugoslavia). As of the Spring of 1994 (USCR, 
1995: 173) these refugees became ineligible for refugee status 
in Serbia and were being forced to return to their 'liberated' 
territories, though not necessarily to the homes they had lived 
in before their flight.  
 In this move, which the Serbian government considered 
imperative for 'national security', it was crucially important, 
both materially and symbolically, to force women to return. A 
Serbian refugee woman explained the problems these women faced: 
They called me, it was April 19, 1994, to report to the 
Red Cross. I got there, one young person and an old 
woman were there. 'Where are your papers, your 
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refugee I.D.[...]Where do you come from?', she asks. 
I said Sarajevo. 'Would you live in Srbinje?'7 I 
didn't need to hear any more[...]I said: Where's 
that? 'Formerly Foca,' she said. And then she went on 
to tell me what state that's in, that it's the 
Bosnian Serb Republic. Where's that, I asked. In 
Africa?[...]And on whose bloody door-step were you 
thinking of settling me? 'Well, Madame, the mujahedin 
killed the Serbs.' Wait a minute, you can't talk to 
me like that[...]How dare you, a clerk, settle me in 
a state I don't belong to[...]'Well,' she said, 
'Mira's8 your name.' So what if my name is Mira? 
'Well you're Serb.'[...]Then I went mad. Me? Dear 
Lord, no. 'What are you?' Jewish. 'Oh, sorry'[...]And 
then I quarrelled with her. And they took away my 
refugee I.D. and pushed this in front of me and said: 
'Here are your papers and go to room 16, they'll put 
a stamp on them and report every fifteen days.' 
That's the way it was then and that's the way it is 
today. 
Although the majority of refugee women in a similar situation 
whom I interviewed were not as vocal as Mira, and were not 
usually prepared to argue directly with state bureaucrats, they 
do resist the oppression in as many ways as possible. The 
                     
    7 A town in Eastern Bosnia-Herzegovina, formerly Foca, with 
a majority Bosnian Muslim population before the war. Currently, 
it is a Serb held town, called Srbinje. All Bosnian Muslims in 
Foca were 'cleansed'. 
    8 A pseudonym. 
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methods of resistance depend primarily on women's education, 
age and place of residence before the flight.  
 Better educated, matured, professional women, from urban 
areas such as Mira are more likely to have skills and resources 
with which to demand protection of their rights. The experience 
of a Croatian Serb refugee woman demonstrates the use of these 
skills 
They [the state bureaucrats] said I didn't have the right 
to stay in Zvezdani Gaj [a collective centre in a 
Belgrade suburb] any longer, that I had to return [to 
'liberated' territory in Croatia], and that I was not 
a refugee but an economic immigrant. I asked them to 
put that in writing. I said, 'I cannot deal with you 
any longer, I will hire a lawyer, pay someone to 
represent me, and let him fight you, I can't anymore. 
Put it in writing that I am an economic immigrant. I, 
with a seven-year-old child, don't have to be the 
first to return.' 
 A number of refugee women have become politically 
conscious and bitter when faced with knowledge of others' 
victimization. In such a context, the opportunity to return 
home seems incomprehensible because of this new consciousness. 
A refugee woman from a Serbian controlled town in Croatia that 
is one of the towns most devastatingly destroyed in the war - 
described her sense of revulsion: 
I can't live in a place in which so many people were 
killed...How can I pass by that kindergarten 
where[...]  that Italian journalist[...]filmed all 
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those slain children in nylon bags. When I pass by 
that kindergarten, I freeze, I can't even look at it, 
let alone live there [...] I don't want to go to the 
Bosnian Serb Republic. Why did they banish the 
Muslims from there? It's awful what's 
happening[...]Let those who liberated, who razed, let 
them be there, live there. 
This political consciousness, however, can hardly be translated 
into an articulated political action. The social ideology which 
'naturalizes' the ethnic-national collectivity and constructs 
women's roles does not tolerate a social space for women's 
autonomous political agency and mobilization. Instead, the 
ideology of ethnic nationalism values a 'natural' (that is 
biological) role for women and thus imposes restrictions on 
their space of action. Whenever women fail to meet these 
criteria they are redefined as 'traitors' to their ethnic-
nation. 
 
Women as Traitors 
 
 The 'naturalization' of the ethnic-national collectivity 
thus has clear gender implications. It rests upon the 
naturalized role of women qua mothers and upon the institution 
of motherhood which defines the 'appropriate' social role of 
women vis-a-vis the family and the nation. Accordingly, the 
state imposes policies facilitating this institutionalization 
and controling women. If they transgress these roles they are 
typically seen as traitors or potential traitors to the nation. 
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 If a refugee woman of the 'right' ethnic-national 
background has children in an ethnically mixed marriage, she 
cannot pass on her citizenship (i.e., the 'proper' nation-state 
membership) to her children unless they first give up their 
'improper' citizenship inherited from their father. This 
particular intervention by the new nation-states is intended to 
return 'women-traitors' to their nationally important role as 
bearers of culture or to exclude them from the ethnic-national 
collectivity and the nation-state.  
 Refugee women who wish to resist giving up their 
children's second citizenship thus try to resettle in a third 
country. Although they may have a better chances for a normal 
life in one of the countries of resettlement, in this context 
resettlement represents one of the strategies of the new 
nation-states to create further 'ethnic cleansing' and to 
strengthen the ethnic-national homogeneity of their 
collectivities.  
 The state's promotion of divisions along ethnic-national 
lines is easily translated into popular discourse in which 
'women-traitors' are stigmatized. This is commonly accompanied 
with the woman's rejection by her family, creating a situation 
where women suffer all the more. One Serbian refugee woman, 
born in Serbia, who lived in Sarajevo for eleven years after 
marrying a Bosnian Muslim, revealed:    
Some neighburs and friends blame me, they say "go to 
Alija"[Izetbegovic, president of Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
[...]"take your Muslim children away," "You should 
all be slaughtered, killed" and more[...]It even went 
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so far that my parents said "let your husband die," 
or "we wish him dead." That hurt me a lot. 
 In a social and political context where state officials 
prefer to govern the 'Serbs as Serbs, not citizens,' the line 
which differentiates between 'good' and 'bad' Serbian women (or 
women-traitors), is rather fragile.  
 In sum, it is clear that uprooted women, once exiled in a 
new nation-state, continue to be marked by their ethnic-
nationality in a rather ambiguous way, an ambiguity  stemming 
from the essentialist definition of the nation-state. 
 
Ambiguities of Women's Ethnic-National Belonging  
 
 The new nation-states construct the roles and status of 
women through ideological discourse which promotes 'the 
centrality of gender hierarchy in processes of identification 
and group reproduction'(Peterson 1996: 7). The public/private 
dichotomy in both popular and policy discourse, therefore, 
strengthens and shapes gender distinctions within and between 
ethnic-national collectivities. The ambiguity of woman's 
ethnic-national identification as a result of gender hierarchy 
is revealed by the words of this young refugee woman from an 
ethnically mixed family: 
I think I'm Serb, I don't "think", I know. My father is, 
so I am, and that's it, no getting around 
that[...]The most important thing is not what I am, 
it's that I was very close to my mother's side, to 
relatives. We were closer to them than father's 
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side.[...]If I thought long and hard about it, I 
don't know where I'd get to. Where would I go? My 
father has very strict views, he held the 
reins[...]When I left I didn't decide who I was, what 
I am, where I'm going. 
  New nation-states promote this hierarchy through 
ideological discourse. The narratives of ethnic-national 
belonging and identity constructed and imposed by states are 
based, as we have seen, on essentialist ideas of 'common 
origin' and 'common destiny'. Even further, the essential 
relationship between such imagined communities (Anderson, 1983) 
is seen "to be one between irreconcilable polarities, as a 
relationship between 'right' and 'wrong', 'superior' and 
'inferior' competitors" (Korac, 1996b: 141). As members of 
ethnic-national collectivities and as participants in ethnic-
national struggles, women tend to take part in and to further 
generate these narratives. However, the ambiguities of their 
ethnic-national belongings as well as experience of their exile 
may render women refugees' locations debatable.  
 This contested location of refugee women is indicated in 
an interview with Vera,9 a Bosnian Serb refugee woman. She 
expressed a profoundly strong sense of ethnic-national 
belonging, as well as a certain moral justification of the 
'Serbian cause for war':  
Well, my place is somewhere where Serbs live. I would 
never ever again go, God forbid. Never, d'you 
understand the meaning of a word? Never.  
                     
    9 A pseudonym. 
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However, minutes later Vera continued: 
Here [in exile in Serbia] one runs into all sorts of 
things every day. D'you understand? We weren't aware 
until the war broke out. D'you know that literally 
nobody helped me?[...]Serbs didn't help me. If I'd 
gone to a Muslim, I would've got accommodation easier 
than from those at the High Commissioner. 
  Experiences of exile expose the hollowness of essentialist 
beliefs in the 'common destiny' of ethnic-national 
collectivities and related narratives, creating counter-
narratives of women's belonging. These counter-narratives 
challenge the totalizing, overwhelmingly male-defined, and 
reifying boundaries of the ethnic-nation and construct 
alternative imagined communities. A Bosnian Serb refugee woman 
explained: 
There are refugees [in collective accommodation][...]from 
various regions. There are Serb, Croat and Muslim 
women[...]We're linked by a common fate[...]I share a 
much better understanding with Croat and Muslim 
refugees than with the people here [in Serbia]. I 
live here, if this can be called a life. They don't 
understand me, I don't understand them. There are 
frequent disputes and I think that I prefer to talk 
to refugees of any nationality, that we understand 
each other better. 
 I do not want to argue that all refugee women have 
articulated their experience of exile and belonging in the same 
way. Here is a contrasting account of a Bosnian Muslim refugee 
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woman, married to a Bosnian Serb: 
Masses of refugees cannot understand me. If I were here 
with my mother, my sister, if we were the same 
nationality, maybe I'd view things differently 
too[...]Everyone says our fate is the same. But I 
can't say it's been the same for everyone[...]This 
war has only limited me, narrowed me down, reduced me 
to merely my children, my husband and his family. And 
it separated me from my mother, sister. I really feel 
I've been damaged a lot in this war, as a human 
being. I'm not aching for those things I had, I'm 
only aching for the people. 
 These accounts convey that experiences around belonging 
cannot be fit to a single mould, but rather that 'all identity 
is constructed across difference' (Hall, 1987: 44). However, in 
a political context where essentialist ethnic-national 
identification based on patriarchal right is informing the 
nation and is central to the claim for power, any form of 
transgroup coalition is a challenge to the power structure. 
What emerges in this context is the political significance of 
divisions among women along seemingly explicit ethnic-national 
lines. By contrast, women's multiple and fluid identifications 
and transgroup solidarities among them tend to disrupt singular 
identification with an essentialized, male-dominated group: the 
nation.  
 
A Concluding Remark: Alternative Politics 
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 The discussion in this chapter has aimed to reveal the 
complex realities of women refugees at the moment when power in 
Serbia radically shifted along unified ethnic-national lines. 
This movement was buttressed by state policies, the public 
media, and education, all of which defended the power 
structures supporting a male-centred conception of the nation 
in which the control of women became a priority. In this 
context, the state-imposed ethnic-national division among 
exiled women, combined with their own diverse experiences of 
conflict and war, tended to reduce the differences among them 
based on age, class and place of residence before the flight, 
and to overshadow similarities of their lived experiences 
regardless of their ethnic-nationality. This analysis, I 
believe, has a potential to uncover 'gendered workings of 
power' (Enloe, 1993) in similar context of violent nation-state 
building, and has wider implications than the region of post-
Yugoslav states, as ethnic nationalism reasserts itself 
worldwide. 
 The analysis has also aimed to identify potential spaces 
for a transformation of the totalizing, male-defined, and 
reifying boundaries of the ethnic-nation. Refugee women, marked 
by ambiguous ethnic-national identifications, have the 
potential, I have suggested here, to become catalysts for 
change. This potential is realised through women's organized 
effort to form coalitions "in which the differences among women 
are recognized and given a voice, without fixating the 
boundaries of this coalition in terms of 'who' we are but in 
terms of what we want to achieve"  (Yuval-Davis, 1994: 189).   
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 Seeds of this organized politics are already extant in the 
political and humanitarian efforts of some local women's 
groups. These women's groups were active in anti-nationalist 
and anti-war campaigns from the very beginning of the conflict 
which errupted in what once was Yugoslavia. Women's groups have 
also initiated and established centres to work with women 
refugees and women who were vere victims of sexual violence in 
war. The process and outcome of this effort are explained by a 
woman activist, a Bosnian Serb refugee: 
They [refugee women] have every right to their 
bitterness[...]However, in some of those talks, I 
would talk about my friends who were of other 
nationalities, we'd read a letter from Sarajevo which 
we got from a Muslim woman. In time they got used to 
being able to talk about neighbours of other 
nationalities - because they came here thinking they 
could never talk about them, that they have to say 
that "they are genocidal", that "they should all be 
killed," in order to make some friends here. Then, in 
time[...]out of the blue friends emerged, daughters 
in law, neighbours, they all emerged out of the blue, 
who didn't exist up to then.  
This politics of the local women's groups has lead to a 
bridging of the differences between women, as well as to a 
process of healing. A Bosnian Muslim refugee woman, who became 
a volunteer in the Autonomous Women's Centre in Belgrade, 
explained the context in which other refugee women in the 
collective centre accepted her: 
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It took me a long time, but they've accepted me finally. I 
think, I might be wrong, but since I've started 
working here in the Centre, they treat me 
differently, because they've seen that other women 
respect me. 
  A real potential of this politics of local women's 
groups, and consequently, a threat to the power relations 
within and between the new nation-states, is best illustrated 
by the words of a Bosnian Muslim refugee woman who fled to 
Croatia:10 
The Centre for Women War Victims of Violence became my 
Embassy. And when you say that, that means that 
someone is representing you, that it's yours. The 
Centre became my Embassy. The Embassy of Bosnia- 
Herzegovina wasn't mine at all. I was there a couple 
of times and I got so angry with them, and I sent 
them to hell[...]. At the Centre I really feel that I 
am on my own territory, those 70 square metres became 
my lost homeland. 
 This politics and effort challenge not only the notion of 
generic 'woman' but also the notion of ethnic-national 
'sameness' stemming in large part from a male-dominated 
discourse. They enable women to stand and speak up for 
themselves as women and as the female representatives of their 
nation, rather than solely as mothers, sisters and wives of men 
                     
    10 This interview was given for a documentary 'A Balkan 
Journey', directed by Brenda Longfellow, Canada. The 
documentary was filmed in Belgrade and Zagreb in the Spring of 
1995. The permission to use the interviews is gratefully 
acknowledged. 
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who represent the nation.  
 The organized support of the local women's groups and the 
success of their efforts to communicate and work across ethnic-
national lines is essential in initiating a process of 
reconstruction and change of the nationalistic politics of 
exclusion in post-Yugoslav states. The forms of women's 
organized work and help to refugee women, discussed in this 
chapter, represent the ways in which women gain subjectivity 
and can become more autonomous political subjects. If 
successful, these efforts can become the avenue to more 
inclusive or gender sensitive notion of citizenship.  
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